United States Military Intervention in Vietnam
Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Communist movement in North Vietnam, began as an ally of the United States. He fought against the Japanese during the occupation of Vietnam during World War 2. He was supported by the United States through the Office of Strategic Services, predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency. The French also supported him during the re-occupation by the Vietnamese after the war had ended. In 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared the Democratic Republic of Vietnam its own sovereign state. He formed an alliance with Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong of China, and the spread of communism in Asia was on the rise.
The current United States policy towards communism at this time was containment. They would use foreign policy and saber rattling to prevent the spread of Communism and contain it in one part of the world. During the escalation and initial development of the Communist nation of Vietnam, the United States and the United Nations were actively combating Communism in the Korean peninsula. This battle, which ultimately ended in stalemate, would determine our success in battling Communism in Southeast Asia.
The conflict in Vietnam began as covert military campaigns against the North. The United States used their covert intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, to give indirect support to the South Vietnamese. The French also gave assistance to guerilla fighters in the South. This would ensure that both nations could “keep their hands clean” with regards to Foreign Policy and effectively work to hold their position in the region.
When the United States began to put “boots on the ground” they did so with our Special Forces. They consisted of Army Green Berets, Air Force Forward Air Controllers, and the newly formed Navy SEALs. The responsibility of these teams at the time was to train the South Vietnamese forces to combat the insurgency, report intelligence to Washington D.C., and to advise intelligence officials to the situation in the country. The whole idea was that Americans would not engage in direct fighting. An effort was made to ensure this, but the best training in any field is hands on, and this proved true in warfare. The Americans would train and then command South Vietnamese in battle to ultimately give them the ability to fight for themselves. The North was just too determined and more forces were needed.
The Vietnam conflict received a full-scale military commitment from the United States between 1965-1973. The amount of troops in the country escalated slowly from 1965 to 1968. It would ultimately near 500,000 Americans serving in Vietnam. The first group of American servicemen arrived in Da Nang. The United States government began with the United States Marine Corps when considering conventional military forces. The mindset on Capitol Hill was that this conflict could still be solved with a small group of Americans leading the South Vietnamese troops and training them to fight. Politically, by sending in the Marine Corps, it gave a statement that more forces in the country would not require a long timetable. Since the Marines are known for being amphibious and can be easily withdrawn back to the sea, they seemed the best option to reassure the rest of the world that there was no significant escalation of military forces. This would be the beginning. Certain Army units would soon be mobilized. These specialized units included the 82nd and 101st Airborne, the 7th Cavalry, and various Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals. Armies of conventional troops and various Marine Expeditionary Forces would soon follow them.
The first Marines to enter Vietnam were inserted using the standard amphibious advance with the aid of Amtrak vehicles and surplus Higgins Boats. India Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines stormed Red Beach in Da Nang on March 8th, 1965 with weapons armed only to be engaged by over a hundred local women and photographers welcoming them to Vietnam. Their reception lasted a day before they were fighting bitter Communist forces just north of Da Nang. (Ermey’s Vietnam)
With a secured American base in Vietnam, the United States had several critical decisions to make that would ultimately determine the outcome of the war. They had several strategies to examine that would be used to reach victory. One strategy was being strongly endorsed by the United States Army, the other, by the United States Marine Corps. The Army’s strategy was a Search and Destroy mission. It would involve relying on an increase in American troops and using our mobility. More specifically would setup a blocking force on one side of a village and a sweeping force will advance and clear the village building by building. They adopted this strategy from the British, who had used it very effectively in Burma during World War II. (Recruit Knowledge) (Ermey’s Vietnam) The strategy endorsed by the Marine Corps was referred to as an Ink Blot operation. This would involve securing coastal bases around the country, such as Da Nang, and gradually spreading out and conducting “clear and hold” missions. (Recruit Knowledge)
Looking in hindsight with a historical perspective, the Marine Corps had the more advantageous strategy. Their operational ideas would slowly corner the Communists into a confined region and make surrender easier to negotiate. This would also be beneficial to the Americans because when fighting an insurgency, the enemy usually has the better mobility and knowledge of the terrain. By enacting an Ink Blot campaign, the Communists would have no place to maneuver.
There was several blunders that the United States performed that ultimately led to defeat. The first one was to enter a war without having any understanding at all of the Vietnamese culture and their history. If there was a better knowledge of Vietnam, they would quickly realize that the Vietnamese do not respond well to foreign occupiers, especially those from the West. If the CIA had taken the time to research, they would have learned of the Trung Sisters, Lady Trieu, and their thousand yearlong struggle against outside influence.
Other factors that influenced the loss of the conflict was that the United States made no effort to win hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese or those of the rest of the world. The United States could have easily gained allies in this effort, but scoffed at the ability and reliability of foreign military forces. The only ally the United States had in active combat was that of the South Vietnamese Army. They lacked discipline, training, and had outdated and inadequate equipment. The commanders in the field were also guilty of failing to control their men when it came to interacting with indigenous peoples. There was a profound amount of collateral damage from ground forces. Villages were burned, civilians were executed, and livestock was butchered.
Another policy that eventually left a smear on the reputation of the United States was the practice of establishing free fire zones. A free fire zone is an area or territory where a senior intelligence commander declares that all friendly civilians and personnel have been removed from the area and that anyone left is an enemy and is suitable for elimination in the field. This proved to be a negative policy because given the confusion in Vietnam about who was the enemy, many friendly Vietnamese were still occupying an area when forces would move in and either capture or kill them.
Most of the confusion or “fog of war” was due to the fact that the Americans were fighting a guerilla force in the South. These fighters were referred to as the Viet Cong or VC. They would use very unconventional methods of conducting war where they would execute very fast and calculated hit and run attacks. This allowed them to fight the Americans only when the Viet Cong believed they had the advantage. Most of the American conventional forces were not accustom to this style of combat. To make things worse, the Viet Cong were not uniformed soldiers. They were dressed as civilians and blended in with society, therefore making it easier to maneuver around the country.
The political effort in Vietnam was lacking due to a weak government in Saigon. Military action alone cannot guarantee a victory in any conflict. The United States needed a firm ally in the South, however, the leaders in the South were incompetent, corrupt, and severely lacked credibility. The United States had failed to create a way to measure success in Vietnam. The only form of measurement was body count. Before this, we would map out how much territory was gained throughout the course of the war. This didn’t work in Vietnam because the front line was 360°. Our forces were too mobile and never settled in a captured territory, leaving it open for enemy occupation.
The turning point in the Vietnam War that eventually turned the public against the war effort was the Tet Offensive. This was where the United States and the North Vietnamese had a scheduled cease-fire during the holiday of Tet, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year. The United States halted offensive operations during this time, but was strongly on the defensive. This decision proved beneficial because the Communist forces had executed simultaneous attacks on American forces throughout South Vietnam. This is considered a climax in the war where public opinion changed and demand that our forces be withdrawn grew louder. This seems strange to many tacticians, because militarily, the Tet offensive was a victory. The United States suffered a surprise attack and battled the Communists for four months after the initial strike and defeated them in their attempt to capture major South Vietnamese cities. The fact that we were actually on the defensive was unacceptable to the mainstream public and news media.
One of the most profound factors affecting the opinion of the war was the fact that the Vietnam War was the first televised war. Previously, the United States government could very effectively control the message released to the public and only broadcast patriotic media. This was a huge culture shock to the folks back home when they would view photos and newsreels of young American servicemen dying in the jungle. The public was not desensitized as most of us are today as far as news coverage goes. One positive note is that we were provided with a vast cache of historical footage and documents. This allows tacticians to study previous blunders, allow historians to examine the course of the war, and give scholars the material to draft educated opinions for debate.
The amount of offensive operations and troop escalation reached maturity and would begin to decline toward the end of the decade. It would ultimately lead to the retreat of American forces and our withdrawal from Vietnam. Many scholars and veterans still alive say in response to Vietnam, we won all of the battles, but we lost the war. I think that has a lot to say about the political importance occurring in every major military conflict even those today.
Saigon fell in 1975. America had no foothold in the country and began to evacuate diplomatic staff and maneuver our forces to their awaiting transport home. Operation Frequent Wind was the iconic mission where helicopters resting on the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon would board employees and refugees and take them to a waiting aircraft carrier. America’s presence in Vietnam ended in April 30th, 1975.
References
"VIETNAM WAR,." 2007. The History Channel website. 17 Feb 2007, 09:10 http://www.history.com/encyclopedia.do?articleId=225210.
Vietnam and the Premises of Intervention
Michael Leifer
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 2. (Summer, 1972), pp.
268-272.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-851X%28197222%2945%3A2%3C268%3AVATPOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T
The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America's
Intervention in Vietnam. (Review)
Chester J. Pach, Jr.
James R. Arnold
The American Historical Review, Vol. 98, No. 2. (Apr.,
1993), pp. 606-607.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762%28199304%2998%3A2%3C606%3ATFDETM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B
U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia: An Appraisal. (Review)
Wolf Mendl Yung-hwan Jo
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3. (Autumn, 1979), pp. 508-509.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-851X%28197923%2952%3A3%3C508%3AUFPIAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V
The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America's Intervention in Vietnam. (Review)
David L. Anderson. James R. Arnold
The Journal of American History, Vol. 79, No. 3,
Discovering America: A Special Issue. (Dec., 1992), p. 1245.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-8723%28199212%2979%3A3%3C1245%3ATFDETM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F
United States Marine Corps. Marine Corps Recruit Depot-San Diego. Recruit Training Regiment. Support Battalion. Instructional Training Company. Recruit Knowledge. January 2001
Marine Corps Association. Guidebook for Marines. 18th Revised Edition. 2nd Printing. Quantico, Va. November 2003.
Ermey’s Vietnam. The History Channel. 6 May 2007. 1:00 PM. Duration: 2 hours.


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