A Two Front War? Why we won the battles, but lost in the end.
***This article was my Bachelor's thesis***
The decision to go to war in Vietnam was a controversial one. Looking back in hindsight, we question whether or not it was necessary, and with a strong consideration to the policy of containment at the time, we then question what was mismanaged and ask if we were as prepared as we could be. No other war had diplomacy, military action, and espionage so well integrated. There is no question as to why we are still studying this pivotal point in America’s history. Whether or not an agreement was made determining America’s success or legitimacy in Vietnam, there is an abundance of factual data we can examine to better understand if America was justified in throwing our military into a warzone. After careful analysis of the events which unfolded in Vietnam, it can be determined that America won on a military front, but lost on a social and political front and this would lead to the imminent withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.
The beginning of America’s involvement started with Eisenhower’s administration. Eisenhower signed on to the ideas of many alarmists and argued that if South Vietnam fell to communists, then all of Southeast Asia would fall. To help counter this, Eisenhower took a lesson from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was successful in holding firm against the Soviet Union in Europe, and he was vital in the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO solidified an alliance with the government of the United States and various other governments in the region who were opposed to Communism and wanted the United States’ help to provide security. There was a fear at the time that if Communism was left unchallenged, they would spread throughout Southeast Asia, spread to Hawaii, and eventually overtake the West Coast of the United States. The concept of this was deemed more than unacceptable by the American government and the policy of containment would be tested to its end during the war in Vietnam.
After the election of 1960, when President John F. Kennedy was sworn into office, the government of the United States added some bite to their bark. Kennedy saw that Southeast Asia would be a theatre of operations where the policy of containment could be put to the test. Kennedy saw that the use of Special Forces in an unconventional role was ideal for repelling South Vietnamese guerillas. He saw how successful the British were using the same strategy in Malaysia and saw that groups such as the Green Berets would be ideal in the jungles of Vietnam. These Special Forces groups were trained in unconventional guerilla warfare and were best suited to provide instruction to the South Vietnamese forces who opposed the Communist aggression.
The Kennedy Administration made all necessary diplomatic efforts to provide security to the Diem regime. Ngo Dinh Diem was picked by the United States to lead South Vietnam because he was strongly opposed to Communism. Lyndon B. Johnson even made a trip to South Vietnam in 1961 and met with Diem to see what was needed to counter the insurgency in the South.
Johnson promised more aid and an increased contingent of Advisors to train the South Vietnamese in the art of jungle warfare. Kennedy has been a long proponent of the Green Berets and has long expressed his admiration for them. He sent them into South Vietnam, not only because they were an elite group capable of providing the much needed assistance, but from a political standpoint, they carried an image as Special Forces operatives. Special Forces operatives typically are not employed for extended duty. They are inserted to accomplish one distinct mission and are immediately extracted from the warzone. This was smart on Kennedy’s part because it provided a message to the American people what we were not sending a large fighting force to the region for prolonged engagement.
Diem had initially requested aid from the United States in the form of a Civil Guard or Self Defense Corps. Kennedy had insisted that the only necessary force that the South needed was a fighting force consisting of 19,000 fighters. Diem assumed command of this force as President and armed them with antiquated French rifles and gave them the responsibility of protecting the South Vietnamese countryside. They were quickly defeated by the Viet Cong and Kennedy provided the finds and other aid needed to establish a permanent Civil Guard.
The primary role of these advisors was to provide training to South Vietnamese resistance fighters. They would pass on their American training to the resistance fighters and arm them with American weapons. The advisors typically spent their time on the sidelines. It was an ambition of the government of the United States not to be actively engaging with the enemy if it could be avoided. This was done to ensure a continuation of diplomatic talks with the government of the Soviet Union.
Beginning in 1962, United States lawmakers began to discuss whether or not Diem was capable of resisting the spread of Communism in his region. In 1963, security officials on the United States began to talk about a regime change in South Vietnam. There was concern whether Diem was seriously committed to the security of his nation, or whether he was just trying to avoid a coup and remain in power.
Ngo Dinh Nhu was Diem’s brother and was in charge of the secret police force and was very much despised among the South Vietnamese people. He was the orchestrator of the repression of Buddhist monks in the region and had the ear of Diem which made his advice very counterproductive to the agenda of the Kennedy Administration. The decision was made to overthrow Diem. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was in contact with military leaders in South Vietnam to overthrow Diem and all the while this move was highly opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff . However, Kennedy and the CIA were in support of it. On November 2nd, 1963, Diem was overthrown and executed with his brother. It was reported that Diem and his brother committed suicide. This was aggressively argued by Diem’s family, citing that the Roman Catholic faith they practiced made their decision to take their own life unlikely. Kennedy was outraged because he had not given the approval for Diem’s murder.
This created a power vacuum in the region and the North Vietnamese were quick to take advantage of the situation by advancing their guerilla campaign in the South. This wasn’t as successful as the North Vietnamese had hoped because no South Vietnamese Army troops were withdrawn from the field to participate actively in the Coup. A new Buddhist regime was installed in Diem’s place. Scholars began to argue that indeed Diem was a failure as a puppet for the United States; he was very good at uniting those in the South.
The pivotal moment in our involvement in Vietnam was the attack of the U.S. Naval Destroyer USS Maddox. This incident became very controversial because there was a second attack on the USS Turner Joy. The attack on the Turner Joy was questionable and the details didn’t coincide among the sailors. The government used this incident to rally support for war and to increase our involvement in Vietnam. Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, ultimately giving the President the power to conduct military operations in Vietnam, and Southeast Asia as a whole, without a declaration of war from Congress.
The USS Maddox was on a reconnaissance mission along the coast of North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin. The ships command reported being attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats while sailing in international waters. The USS Turner Joy was en route to the gulf when the USS Maddox reported they were being attacked. The USS Turner Joy was running at full steam to provide assistance to the Maddox, but by the time the Turner Joy had arrived, the torpedo boats had fled.
With the newfound power provided by Congress, the President was in a position where he could launch a massive ground attack against the Communists. Johnson immediately coordinated intelligence among the CIA and members of the intelligence community in the Armed Forces. It was now inevitable that there would be American troops sent to Vietnam and the Advisors that are already in the Southeast Asian Theatre of Operation would be removed from the sidelines and full scale combat would soon occur.
Much deliberation began between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps regarding the strategy that would be best suited to the terrain and to the culture as a whole. The Army wanted to conduct a series of sweep and clear campaigns and relying mostly on mobility. The Marine Corps wanted to conduct an “ink blot” strategy which would require American forces to install many coastal bases, such as Da Nang, and slowly move out and capture territory and have Reserve forces holding the captured areas. This was aggressively proposed by the Marines since they had learned in Haiti and Nicaragua prior to the conflict in Vietnam that it is vital to maintain control over captured terrain and maintain a frontline as to avoid an insurgency.
On March 8th, 1965, there were 3,500 Marines from the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade that landed at Da Nang, essentially sparking a full scale military commitment for the United States. The Marines were chosen as an initial conventional fighting force for the same reasons that the Special Forces were chosen as Advisors early in the War. The Marine Corps is amphibious and therefore carries an aura of short term engagement. This way, the Johnson Administration could increase the scale of the War slowly as to not shock the public into full scale war and maintain a certain level of support.
Surprisingly, the public opinion from the United States was overwhelmingly positive. Americans were use to the Marines entering and leaving a warzone in short, but effective campaigns. The whole idea at the time, especially in Washington D.C., was that Vietnam was a key ally in the fight against Communism and victory would be deemed essential for the nation’s policy of containment to hold its legitimacy.
This brought the total number to 23,500 of American military personnel already in Vietnam and they were assigned to protecting United States airfields such as Da Nang by the use of Hawk ground-to-air missiles and also to protect the American Embassy in Saigon. The remainder of servicemen in the country acted as advisers to the South Vietnamese. The additional Marines were sent to Vietnam with a promise from President Johnson that they would not see or engage in active combat. They were only being sent to Da Nang to assist in protecting the American airfields.
This necessity became clear after July 1, 1965 when a Viet Cong demolition squad infiltrated the United States airbase at Da Nang. The squad damaged several aircraft during this attack reinforcing the need for more Marines to expand their patrol radius to better provide force security. Just prior to the attack the 7th Regimental Landing Team, made up entirely of Marines, landed near Chu Lai and was prepared to provide the additional personnel that the Americans at Da Nang so desperately needed.
At the time, the decision to go to war in Vietnam was directly reflective of United States policy. Certain factors also contributed which held little legitimacy with the American public. Such institutions as the military industrial complex demanded an increase in activity in the market for the economy to grow. This would lead to a growth of conspiracy theories regarding exactly what influence business had on the Johnson Administration and would ultimately affect public support later on.
We can see the repercussions of our anti-Communist ambitions decades later and have a firm understanding with respect to the blunders which were made through the duration of the conflict. An emergence of cultural and anthropological knowledge has come to light and holds more relevance today than it did to the policymakers of the 1960s. We can examine various ideologies which made the Vietnamese such radical fighters. They were instilled from birth with a strong feeling of homogeneous pride and a certain degree of xenophobia.
The Vietnamese, for close to around one thousand years, have shown fierce resistance to foreign controlling powers. Their resentment and national pride do not weaken with each generation. Scholars during the 1960s knew this and knew the United States would be in for a difficult fight. The Vietnamese had maintained resistance attitudes for centuries of Chinese rule beginning in the 1st Century B.C. which spanned nearly a millennium.
The Vietnamese would also hold up to the next generation patriotic figures such as the Trung Sisters and Phan Chu Trinh, who led a peaceful movement against the French. The Trung Sisters, however, were a more substantial rallying tool. These two sisters were largely responsible for repelling Chinese rule during the beginning of the 1st Century A.D. and represented the determination for autonomy that each Vietnamese nationalist felt inside. This also fueled resentment against the pro-Western leaders of the South who wanted full cooperation with the United States.
General William Westmoreland was the Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) beginning in 1964 and would later become the Army Chief of Staff in 1968. General Westmoreland drafted a comprehensive three point plan that would achieve victory in Vietnam and he aggressively lobbied this strategy to policymakers in Washington D.C. to increase support for military involvement. His plan was conducive to victory given the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine during the 1960s. It encompassed everything from an increase of troops to the use of NATO and regional alliances.
Phase one of Westmoreland’s plan was to rally support, not only from the United States, but also from other Western and pro-democracy governments to turn the tide of war. At this time, the United States was fighting a figurative uphill battle. Our troops were always taught to fight the last war. The conflict in Vietnam was a significant change with regard to the tactics employed by the enemy. Our conventional forces were not accustomed to fighting against an invisible enemy such as booby traps and civilian combatants. Westmoreland’s goal was to put the United States and its allies on the offensive and formulate a means to measure success.
General Westmoreland continues his strategy with the second part involving a large scale offensive campaign. There was some hesitation in Washington D.C. regarding large scale combat, however Westmoreland gave an anticipated victory date for 1967 and this gave a false end to an open ended situation. The second part of this plan was strictly combative. His goal was to destroy many of the guerilla fighters and as many of the uniformed regular enemy forces as possible. Westmoreland’s goal was to put the enemy in a defensive situation and slowly push them from metropolitan or populated areas.
Westmoreland concluded his strategy citing that if the enemy remained a threat the United States would need to continue their efforts for another at least another year and attack them in their remote posts. This plan was successful in achieving enough support to continue, especially from President Johnson. Perhaps the largest cause of this strategy’s popularity was the fact that the United States was caught in a stalemate, not because the United States lacked the means to combat the enemy, but simply because United States policy prior to Westmoreland’s efforts didn’t allow full scale military involvement.
Johnson was decisive in forming public opinion after Westmoreland received approval because he maintained a sense of feeling where nothing new was occurring in Vietnam. He expressed to the media that we were still assisting the South Vietnamese and how the responsibility of defeating Communist forces fell solely on the South Vietnamese military, as it did prior to Westmoreland moving on the offensive. With the sense of continuity occupying the public and Johnson’s war powers he received from Congress, the executive branch gained near absolutism in regards to the management of troops and the campaigns that would be waged.
Throughout America’s involvement in Vietnam, the military had to disguise its offensive missions as retaliation for an attack on American forces, largely because the war had prominent critics in Congress and no politician would denounce the American military’s inherent right to self-defense. Johnson was hard at work back in Washington carefully carving the image of our mission which would suit American policy and satisfy his desire to continue what President Kennedy had begun. While this was occurring, the United States military was preparing for full scale offensive combat on a scale unseen since World War Two. A pivotal moment came near the Vietnamese city of Chu Lai where units within the 3rd Marine Division mounted an offensive against the Vietcong.
On August 18th, 1965, all diplomacy had failed and the Marines launched Operation Starlight from three fronts. From the southeast, an amphibious assault; from the west, a hellebore assault; and from the north, the infantry moved in. The Viet Cong was trapped in the Van Ton Peninsula and nearly one thousand enemy kills were achieved on August 24th . This battle was significant because it gave the American people and politicians at home a public victory which would lessen dissent among war critics for the time being.
This particular battle was one of the few times where the Viet Cong fought in a conventional sense. Being mostly a guerilla force, they were fond of attacking small groups of Americans from concealed locations and immediately moving into another location. Their attempt to stand up to the American military would not soon be repeated. Nevertheless, the 1st Vietcong Regiment was disassembled as an effective fighting force and they felt their first defeat while losing their safe havens along the coast.
As with most conflicts, a nation or other occupying force cannot achieve victory solely based on military efforts. Diplomats and intelligence officials are still active in trying to lessen the length and intensity of war. Every branch in the American armed forces employs Officers who are educated in engaging with the indigenous public and battle the enemy on a social front.
There seemed to be a new trend within the American populous where a violent attitude was adopted towards the war in Vietnam and towards the troops fighting there. This was prevalent on the floors of Congress where the decision to go to war was being constantly questioned. Propaganda would be employed throughout Vietnam, but also surprisingly, at home in America. This effort was mainly to help ease the friction between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of Congress who never voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and still actively proposed the standing down of American forces in Vietnam.
However, without political stability in Vietnam, there would be no political stability at home. With the U.S. Military’s counterinsurgency operations in full swing, our Generals in the field acknowledged the need for thorough improvement and maintenance of public affairs efforts. Our politicians saw blunders from the past and adopted a policy where the government of the United States publicly denounced the use of torture. Anything that happened covertly, however, would not be disclosed. This did not add any unneeded motivation for the enemy to feed on. It would actually encourage cooperation from indigenous people in Vietnam and assist with our counterinsurgency efforts.
Perhaps the strongest element of this cooperation was the use of Combined Action Platoons or CAPs. CAPs were the primary example used back home to convey a sense of partnership with the South Vietnamese. CAPs were made up of thirty eight men from the South Vietnamese Popular Force and were embedded with a Marine Rifle Squad and given the task of protecting a single South Vietnamese village. This was key in the success of America’s counterinsurgency efforts and was also the cornerstone in maintaining Congressional support back home, thusly assuring the continuance of military operation overseas.
The strategic and political importance of this strategy was that by having an American military force located in each village accompanied by indigenous Vietnamese soldiers, it would ultimately instill in each citizen a sense of trust and they would turn to the CAPs for assistance or advice instead of pledging loyalty to the Viet Cong. This gave the Vietnamese a sense of stability and security because they were confident in the CAPs fighting ability and grew comfortable in the fact that their villages were safe.
Since the decision to go to war had already been made, and some would argue it was inevitable, the only democratic tool available was debate. This occurred on the floors of Congress as well as in the media. There became a point when the Johnson Administration needed to determine how much information they would be allowed to withhold under the Constitution. There was a large debate and concern over what could be deliberated during a time of war, not only among the public, but within the government. This led to a practice of publicly condemning Policymakers who had opposed the war and labeled them as un-patriotic. We see this today and throughout the span of American political history.
The need for regulated censorship became clear. Scare tactics were employed to justify this action which was dangerously close to being unconstitutional such as the fear of Communist infiltration in American society. These efforts most often took the form of withdrawing funding to programs which had affiliations with anti-war movements or those who were overtly critical of the Johnson Administration.
Perhaps the largest tool used by the Presidents during the Vietnam War was to either misdirect or not disclose casualty figures from the battlefield. Nixon was very skilled at this as he would report casualty figures as “low” when they were higher than he was anticipating or was previously told. This was widely used by Commanders and Politicians alike in an effort to maintain the succession of opinion that the decision to go to war in Vietnam was correct, despite the knowledge obtained through hindsight.
The North Vietnamese acted with very little concern regarding lives lost or the body count. Ho Chi Minh and his top advisors expressed that they would fight down to the last man in exchange for a final victory. This method of measurement itself is largely imprecise due to the practice of falsifying records on both sides as a method of propaganda.
Since the war in Vietnam was so controversial, there was widespread social outcry demanding that the United States withdraw from Vietnam and that our troops, politicians, and commanders were responsible for all atrocities that occurred in Vietnam. The largest cause for this growing movement was the broadcast media. For the first time in history, there was a television set in most households and you had a well known news figure embedded with the military reporting what was happening in very vivid visual detail. In prior conflicts, newsreels would be edited, not necessarily to supply a bias, but to shield the public from the horrors of war. This practice was seen as counterproductive from a news standpoint and was viewed as unethical.
One of the root causes to the widespread broadcast of negative Vietnam coverage is the institution of competition. Since Vietnam was seen as negative due to the cause of war being unclear and discrepancies coming from the Oval Office, many Americans had preconceived ideas that the war in Vietnam was bad. The news companies simply needed to stay up in the ratings and polls taken from random samples declared that American were more receptive to negative war coverage.
The group throughout the nation who had the loudest voice crying out dissent and was most active in protest was the Counterculture. The Counterculture had various celebrities, such as the Grateful Dead and Jimi Hendrix, to endorse them and had many followers to spread their message coast to coast. The Counterculture battled many issues such as racial equality to women’s rights and had social criticisms which were well received to teenage and college-age Americans. However, the most publicized effort, and the one which left their mark on the History books, was their effort to end the war in Vietnam. It is important to note that the Counterculture was voicing their opposition to the war since its early stages and it was only when the mainstream public grew frustrated with the way it was being handled was when the Counterculture became the unofficial spokesmen for society.
College campuses became a prime venue for antiwar protests and accommodated a free discussion of the issues. This tradition continues in almost all Colleges across the United States. The Counter Culture used the reputable names of their respective schools and the news media to spread their message, quite effectively, from coast to coast. This was largely caused by overwhelming agreement that the war in Vietnam needed to end quickly and was fueled by reports of war crimes on the battlefield committed by Americans.
Although the Counterculture was not the sole cause for America’s withdrawal from Vietnam, they were pivotal in changing public policy. They lived out an American Dream that you never hear about anymore; one which was not of material ambitions. They lived out the American Dream where a few people speaking out in protest on a college campus in San Francisco can change the mind of some of the most powerful people in the world all the way in Washington D.C. and change the tone surrounding the war in Vietnam.
The climax of the war in Vietnam, at least from a political standpoint, came on March 3, 1968. President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he would not run for reelection. This was a huge hit to the morale of the troops fighting overseas because it was the Kennedy-Johnson Administration who came to the American people with a plan and were the key architects in our involvement over in Vietnam. However, Johnson’s failing health and the internal division of the Democratic Party during 1968 made the inevitable campaign undesirable for a President seeking a sure victory. Shortly after Johnson had announced his intentions not to seek reelection, a discussion began on Capitol Hill regarding the eventual withdrawal of troops.
Just a few miles down the Potomac, the Pentagon had their own crisis to deal with; one which would be a military success, but would change the tide of public opinion at home. The Tet Offensive, which occurred during January of 1968, was a pivotal moment in America’s mission in Vietnam that would change everything. During the holiday of Tet (Lunar New Year) the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong broke a ceasefire which was in effect and launched a surprise attack on 100 cities across Vietnam. Although the Americans and allies were quick to respond and repelled the attackers, ultimately claiming victory, this event had the opposite effect at home. This was seen as a severe failure in intelligence and eventually led to widespread distrust in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of President.
Richard Nixon was elected by a slim majority over Hubert Humphrey. Nixon made it very clear that he wanted to end the war in Vietnam. He constantly expressed the need for “peace with honor”. He and Dr. Henry Kissinger, who was Nixon’s Secretary of State, worked feverishly to ease tensions between the Soviet Union and China and to work on a multilateral base to peacefully transfer the security of South Vietnam back to the South Vietnamese. In addition, Nixon called upon the allies of the United States to assist in securing peace.
Many have tried to decipher the phrase “peace with honor” since Nixon coined it during the 1968 Presidential Election. Nixon wanted to call on the “silent majority” of Americans who still thought that the United States could win in Vietnam, but achieved little support on that issue. Many had warned that it would be political suicide to promote a pro-war agenda and that the only necessary means to try and secure victory would be to stay the course in Vietnam.
Nixon stated later in 1973 that the government of the United States would continually recognize the Republic of Vietnam as the sole governing body of South Vietnam. By this policy, South Vietnam was still considered an ally of the United States and Nixon made large efforts to arm the Army of the Republic of Vietnam or ARVN. This practice would prove disastrous when the North Vietnamese Army invaded South Vietnam and captured Saigon two years later. The beginning of the end in Vietnam was just beginning.
Many critics of the war in Vietnam, however, fail to recognize the correctness of the government’s actions in the region. It’s very easy and unnecessary to point out what “should” have been done when looking back at an event with contemporary knowledge. The United States had a policy of containment to uphold and was actively battling Communism for over a decade at the war’s onset. The United States also had an obligation to our allies in South Vietnam by helping them with the same principles that were expressed during the Korean War. The decision to go to war had already been made and the problem now was finding a way to peacefully and honorably withdraw from Vietnam while supporting our allies all while using tactile methods which would preserve the most life.
This didn’t seem to be a large concern of the anti-war doves. The American military needed to leave Vietnam, and now. The confidence that Americans once felt with respect to the Office of the President of the United States were disappearing. On June 13th 1971, the New York Times published excerpts from a study which soon became referred to as the Pentagon Papers. These documents were leaked to the New York Times by Daniel Ellsberg which disclosed the American involvement in Vietnam beginning in 1945. The suspicions that many critics carried with them would soon be proven when information was made public about how the war was intentionally continued by dropping bombs over Laos and all of the tools and strategies which were in opposition to the public policies of the United States, but were employed anyway, were brought to light and put under scrutiny by Congress.
The election of 1972 was, in a way, a referendum on the war in Vietnam. This was the center issue of the election and the Candidates used the deteriorating public support to offer a resolution to the war. President Richard Nixon ran as the Republican incumbent and, yet again, approached the American people with a promise of peace. Nixon’s Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger was active during this time in a peace negotiation with North Vietnam, but needed to draft terms which would be acceptable for the government of South Vietnam. These negotiations began as a secret, but the North soon went public when they deemed the peace agreement favored the American’s ally of South Vietnam. Nixon needed to make a move which would please South Vietnam and force North Vietnam back into the peace talks.
Last ditch efforts were employed by the United States to turn the tide of war. Prior to this, the United States has not lost a war and the closest the United States military has ever come to defeat was the stalemate of the Korean War. There were massive air campaigns launched over North Vietnam; some were aggressive in nature, however some were defensive maneuvers or pre-emptive strikes.
Operation Linebacker was the first large scale air bombardment campaign since President Johnson had halted further air attacks in the North earlier in 1968. Like most deep missions, this was a joint effort among the three branches wielding airpower and made valuable use of the Air Forces B-52 bombers. The main intention of this campaign was to decrease the materials and personnel moving south to fight in the Easter Offensive.
The Easter Offensive was a massive attack by the North against the South Vietnamese and the United States. The conventional element of the North Vietnamese Army was the largest ever seen by the United States since the Korean War. This Easter Offensive was significant because this was the first attempt to invade South Vietnam since the Tet Offensive four years earlier. Victory was eventually claimed by both sides since the North Vietnamese suffered high casualties, but made their way deep into the Southern territory. The North was also successful in capturing numerous South Vietnamese units stationed in remote bases throughout the countryside west of Da Nang.
Operation Linebacker 2 was an air campaign on a massive scale. The United States Air Force bombed Hanoi and destroyed much of the North Vietnamese infrastructure. The United States was successful in this attempt because the North Vietnamese left Hanoi and other largely populated areas virtually undefended due to the presumption that the United States and the South would not invade North Vietnam. There were, however, surface-to-air missiles spread throughout the North and Communist fighter jets stationed sporadically.
This event was pivotal, not only on the battlefield, but at home. This air campaign put the North in a situation where they had no choice but to negotiate. While this was occurring in the military world, the Nixon Administration pressured the government of South Vietnam to accept the terms of peace as they were or risk the loss of American aid. The counterculture and dissenters in the United States were quick to respond with, yet another period of intense anti-war protests.
Naturally, this wasn’t well received at home or in Saigon. Nixon had essentially put both the government of South Vietnam and the American people between a rock and a hard place. Saigon and the United States had decades of cooperation behind them and neither party wanted the war to continue. The North Vietnamese themselves had drained much of their resources fighting this war and, although reluctant, succumbed to Operation Linebacker 2 and approached the peace talks.
Thanks to much effort by Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Paris Peace Accord was signed on January 27, 1973. This action ultimately ended America’s direct military involvement in Vietnam. We would, however, need to maintain diplomatic relations with the South and maintain the welfare of our military still stationed in South Vietnam. This did temporarily cease fighting in Vietnam, but as the military mobilized in areas throughout Vietnam, small firefights would continue to take American’s lives. In addition, the security of the American Embassy in Saigon became even more inherent as it would soon become America’s only safe haven in the country.
The Paris Peace Accords was a very simple solution to a very complicated and long standing problem, or so it seemed. The agreement was a success as it did allow our forces to recover the dead bodies of American servicemen and exchange Prisoners of War, but it would be short lived. In December of 1974, the North Vietnamese attacked the South in a series of guerilla style skirmishes. This was obviously a breach of the Paris Peace Accords and surprised the government in the South and was received in the United States as a provocative act by the Government and Joint Chiefs of Staff, but as typical by many Americans.
This was clearly a prime example of what two nations see as an acceptable means to secure peace. The military wanted peace through diplomatic means since a prolonged and costly war would be unacceptable to many Americans, but maintained military involvement as long as the South needed them. The North aspired to end the war through the defeat of the South and felt that any peace agreement which included the United States would favor the pro-western government of South Vietnam.
Shortly after the offensive by the North Vietnamese, the President of South Vietnam resigned and blamed much of the failure on the United States. He stated in a radio broadcast after he left office that the South was betrayed by the United States due largely to the fact that the United States cut much of the foreign aid which the South was receiving prior to the Paris Peace Accords. The United States pledged to end direct involvement, which included financial support for the South Vietnamese military. This left the South Vietnamese military high and dry with nominal domestic resources to rely on for victory.
President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam claimed that he was tricked into signing the Paris Peace Accords by Henry Kissinger. He stated that Kissinger, on behalf of the United States, promised military aid to help repel the incoming North Vietnamese and secure a sovereign border. The United States, at the time, stated that they would continue their air support in a defensive role as to not violate the Paris Peace Accord. The United States did not act when their ally was in trouble and this was later acknowledged by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.
With the United States bound to the peace agreement, they quickly focused their efforts and resources to moving and evacuating American military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel out of Vietnam. The North was aggressively conquering the South and with many funds from the Communist Bloc, was able to reinforce and recruit new members to the Viet Cong in the South. They carefully conquered the villages that the Americans had once successfully controlled and used fear to fuel chaos on the streets of Saigon.
With the political structure of South Vietnam collapsing, America’s allies were in danger of retaliation by the North. The security blanket provided by the United States had been repealed by those who were thousands of miles away and indigenous personnel and other civilians were left to fend for themselves or escape via American helicopter. Martial law was ordered throughout Saigon and quickly fueled the unrest already in existence. North Vietnamese tanks rolled into Saigon and quickly engulfed the border areas of the city. The airport located within the city was shelled by NVA rocket and mortar attack rendering the station inoperable.
Operation Frequent Wind commenced. American helicopters throughout Saigon quickly evacuated American military personnel and diplomatic civilians. The code word for this operation was a reference to the weather in Japan followed by the playing of “White Christmas”. This was made available to the news media and eventually was made known to local Vietnamese. Once the signal was given, thousands of Vietnamese rushed to the Embassy in an attempt to escape the defeat which was sure to come.
This effort was a joint campaign between the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and CIA. The joint military aircraft largely consisted of various versions of the Chinook helicopter. This aircraft which uses twin rotors and can lift a larger capacity than most helicopters. The CIA used Air America, which is a privately employed air service used by the CIA as civilian satellite organization. Operation Frequent Wind was successful from a military standpoint as it accomplished all military objectives.
The second to last helicopter to leave the Embassy carried the Ambassador to a naval warship waiting 80 miles away. There was still a small squad of Marines left on the Embassy roof, mainly consisting of Military Police. There was a small discrepancy in the plans and it was assumed that the remaining Marines were accompanying the Ambassador on the helicopter. It wasn’t until he was received back on the Navy ship that it was discovered that Marines were still on the rooftop. Three hours after the Ambassador was extracted, the remaining Marines were taken to safety.
Many lessons were learned from Vietnam and certain measures were taken to ensure it most likely wouldn’t happen again. The War Powers Act of 1973, also known as Public Law 93-148, was passed in Congress. This would essentially repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and from then on, the President as Commander in Chief, would have absolute power over the military for a period of 60 days. After the initial period, the President would need to obtain power from Congress to continue his efforts, whatever they may be. These Congressional resolutions themselves have an expiration date which keeps both branches of government in check.
The war in Vietnam was unique in the fact that a large majority of battles or skirmishes were won by Americans or Combined Action units. There was relative stability in the South as far as government was concerned, although there were military assaults targeting civilians which accompanies the fog of war scenario in an insurgency. Progress from a tactical standpoint was slow progressing, but the stalemate observed from a South Vietnamese government facing a Communist takeover was seen as a victory.
Never before in American history had military and politics been so intertwined that it grew to be counterproductive to victory in Southeast Asia. In prior wars, Generals were given much latitude in their decision making abilities, mainly out of necessity. During Vietnam, however, the Commanders in the field and Diplomats in Saigon could speak with the President in real time and receive his authorization to proceed with military plans. This caused some problems because a General doesn’t have to run for reelection and therefore be so inclined to make decisions based on public opinion.
Public opinion has never been so vital to the way that war was waged. Young Americans and Counterculture members proved that democracy wasn’t just a theory. They showed what can happen when enough Americans who want change work together to achieve it. The television set was used as a vital tool for directing the populous by both the Government and dissenters alike. We can verify this decades later as nearly all aspects of our lives involve, in some way, a television set.
The war in Vietnam was one of the most costly; not in human life, but in materials and natural resources. The phrase which comes to mind is that you cannot simply go to war, but that you need to take a nation to war. From this idea, Vietnam was a failure due to the unilateral move by the Executive Branch and the clever misdirection of facts to increase our involvement. It is hard to say that with enough resolve the United States could have won in Vietnam. It is safe to say that with the right strategy and a concise knowledge of the nation’s history, many blunders could have been overcame and the war may have ended in victory earlier than anticipated.
References
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newsid_2935000/2935347.stm
The decision to go to war in Vietnam was a controversial one. Looking back in hindsight, we question whether or not it was necessary, and with a strong consideration to the policy of containment at the time, we then question what was mismanaged and ask if we were as prepared as we could be. No other war had diplomacy, military action, and espionage so well integrated. There is no question as to why we are still studying this pivotal point in America’s history. Whether or not an agreement was made determining America’s success or legitimacy in Vietnam, there is an abundance of factual data we can examine to better understand if America was justified in throwing our military into a warzone. After careful analysis of the events which unfolded in Vietnam, it can be determined that America won on a military front, but lost on a social and political front and this would lead to the imminent withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.
The beginning of America’s involvement started with Eisenhower’s administration. Eisenhower signed on to the ideas of many alarmists and argued that if South Vietnam fell to communists, then all of Southeast Asia would fall. To help counter this, Eisenhower took a lesson from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was successful in holding firm against the Soviet Union in Europe, and he was vital in the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO solidified an alliance with the government of the United States and various other governments in the region who were opposed to Communism and wanted the United States’ help to provide security. There was a fear at the time that if Communism was left unchallenged, they would spread throughout Southeast Asia, spread to Hawaii, and eventually overtake the West Coast of the United States. The concept of this was deemed more than unacceptable by the American government and the policy of containment would be tested to its end during the war in Vietnam.
After the election of 1960, when President John F. Kennedy was sworn into office, the government of the United States added some bite to their bark. Kennedy saw that Southeast Asia would be a theatre of operations where the policy of containment could be put to the test. Kennedy saw that the use of Special Forces in an unconventional role was ideal for repelling South Vietnamese guerillas. He saw how successful the British were using the same strategy in Malaysia and saw that groups such as the Green Berets would be ideal in the jungles of Vietnam. These Special Forces groups were trained in unconventional guerilla warfare and were best suited to provide instruction to the South Vietnamese forces who opposed the Communist aggression.
The Kennedy Administration made all necessary diplomatic efforts to provide security to the Diem regime. Ngo Dinh Diem was picked by the United States to lead South Vietnam because he was strongly opposed to Communism. Lyndon B. Johnson even made a trip to South Vietnam in 1961 and met with Diem to see what was needed to counter the insurgency in the South.
Johnson promised more aid and an increased contingent of Advisors to train the South Vietnamese in the art of jungle warfare. Kennedy has been a long proponent of the Green Berets and has long expressed his admiration for them. He sent them into South Vietnam, not only because they were an elite group capable of providing the much needed assistance, but from a political standpoint, they carried an image as Special Forces operatives. Special Forces operatives typically are not employed for extended duty. They are inserted to accomplish one distinct mission and are immediately extracted from the warzone. This was smart on Kennedy’s part because it provided a message to the American people what we were not sending a large fighting force to the region for prolonged engagement.
Diem had initially requested aid from the United States in the form of a Civil Guard or Self Defense Corps. Kennedy had insisted that the only necessary force that the South needed was a fighting force consisting of 19,000 fighters. Diem assumed command of this force as President and armed them with antiquated French rifles and gave them the responsibility of protecting the South Vietnamese countryside. They were quickly defeated by the Viet Cong and Kennedy provided the finds and other aid needed to establish a permanent Civil Guard.
The primary role of these advisors was to provide training to South Vietnamese resistance fighters. They would pass on their American training to the resistance fighters and arm them with American weapons. The advisors typically spent their time on the sidelines. It was an ambition of the government of the United States not to be actively engaging with the enemy if it could be avoided. This was done to ensure a continuation of diplomatic talks with the government of the Soviet Union.
Beginning in 1962, United States lawmakers began to discuss whether or not Diem was capable of resisting the spread of Communism in his region. In 1963, security officials on the United States began to talk about a regime change in South Vietnam. There was concern whether Diem was seriously committed to the security of his nation, or whether he was just trying to avoid a coup and remain in power.
Ngo Dinh Nhu was Diem’s brother and was in charge of the secret police force and was very much despised among the South Vietnamese people. He was the orchestrator of the repression of Buddhist monks in the region and had the ear of Diem which made his advice very counterproductive to the agenda of the Kennedy Administration. The decision was made to overthrow Diem. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was in contact with military leaders in South Vietnam to overthrow Diem and all the while this move was highly opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff . However, Kennedy and the CIA were in support of it. On November 2nd, 1963, Diem was overthrown and executed with his brother. It was reported that Diem and his brother committed suicide. This was aggressively argued by Diem’s family, citing that the Roman Catholic faith they practiced made their decision to take their own life unlikely. Kennedy was outraged because he had not given the approval for Diem’s murder.
This created a power vacuum in the region and the North Vietnamese were quick to take advantage of the situation by advancing their guerilla campaign in the South. This wasn’t as successful as the North Vietnamese had hoped because no South Vietnamese Army troops were withdrawn from the field to participate actively in the Coup. A new Buddhist regime was installed in Diem’s place. Scholars began to argue that indeed Diem was a failure as a puppet for the United States; he was very good at uniting those in the South.
The pivotal moment in our involvement in Vietnam was the attack of the U.S. Naval Destroyer USS Maddox. This incident became very controversial because there was a second attack on the USS Turner Joy. The attack on the Turner Joy was questionable and the details didn’t coincide among the sailors. The government used this incident to rally support for war and to increase our involvement in Vietnam. Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, ultimately giving the President the power to conduct military operations in Vietnam, and Southeast Asia as a whole, without a declaration of war from Congress.
The USS Maddox was on a reconnaissance mission along the coast of North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin. The ships command reported being attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats while sailing in international waters. The USS Turner Joy was en route to the gulf when the USS Maddox reported they were being attacked. The USS Turner Joy was running at full steam to provide assistance to the Maddox, but by the time the Turner Joy had arrived, the torpedo boats had fled.
With the newfound power provided by Congress, the President was in a position where he could launch a massive ground attack against the Communists. Johnson immediately coordinated intelligence among the CIA and members of the intelligence community in the Armed Forces. It was now inevitable that there would be American troops sent to Vietnam and the Advisors that are already in the Southeast Asian Theatre of Operation would be removed from the sidelines and full scale combat would soon occur.
Much deliberation began between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps regarding the strategy that would be best suited to the terrain and to the culture as a whole. The Army wanted to conduct a series of sweep and clear campaigns and relying mostly on mobility. The Marine Corps wanted to conduct an “ink blot” strategy which would require American forces to install many coastal bases, such as Da Nang, and slowly move out and capture territory and have Reserve forces holding the captured areas. This was aggressively proposed by the Marines since they had learned in Haiti and Nicaragua prior to the conflict in Vietnam that it is vital to maintain control over captured terrain and maintain a frontline as to avoid an insurgency.
On March 8th, 1965, there were 3,500 Marines from the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade that landed at Da Nang, essentially sparking a full scale military commitment for the United States. The Marines were chosen as an initial conventional fighting force for the same reasons that the Special Forces were chosen as Advisors early in the War. The Marine Corps is amphibious and therefore carries an aura of short term engagement. This way, the Johnson Administration could increase the scale of the War slowly as to not shock the public into full scale war and maintain a certain level of support.
Surprisingly, the public opinion from the United States was overwhelmingly positive. Americans were use to the Marines entering and leaving a warzone in short, but effective campaigns. The whole idea at the time, especially in Washington D.C., was that Vietnam was a key ally in the fight against Communism and victory would be deemed essential for the nation’s policy of containment to hold its legitimacy.
This brought the total number to 23,500 of American military personnel already in Vietnam and they were assigned to protecting United States airfields such as Da Nang by the use of Hawk ground-to-air missiles and also to protect the American Embassy in Saigon. The remainder of servicemen in the country acted as advisers to the South Vietnamese. The additional Marines were sent to Vietnam with a promise from President Johnson that they would not see or engage in active combat. They were only being sent to Da Nang to assist in protecting the American airfields.
This necessity became clear after July 1, 1965 when a Viet Cong demolition squad infiltrated the United States airbase at Da Nang. The squad damaged several aircraft during this attack reinforcing the need for more Marines to expand their patrol radius to better provide force security. Just prior to the attack the 7th Regimental Landing Team, made up entirely of Marines, landed near Chu Lai and was prepared to provide the additional personnel that the Americans at Da Nang so desperately needed.
At the time, the decision to go to war in Vietnam was directly reflective of United States policy. Certain factors also contributed which held little legitimacy with the American public. Such institutions as the military industrial complex demanded an increase in activity in the market for the economy to grow. This would lead to a growth of conspiracy theories regarding exactly what influence business had on the Johnson Administration and would ultimately affect public support later on.
We can see the repercussions of our anti-Communist ambitions decades later and have a firm understanding with respect to the blunders which were made through the duration of the conflict. An emergence of cultural and anthropological knowledge has come to light and holds more relevance today than it did to the policymakers of the 1960s. We can examine various ideologies which made the Vietnamese such radical fighters. They were instilled from birth with a strong feeling of homogeneous pride and a certain degree of xenophobia.
The Vietnamese, for close to around one thousand years, have shown fierce resistance to foreign controlling powers. Their resentment and national pride do not weaken with each generation. Scholars during the 1960s knew this and knew the United States would be in for a difficult fight. The Vietnamese had maintained resistance attitudes for centuries of Chinese rule beginning in the 1st Century B.C. which spanned nearly a millennium.
The Vietnamese would also hold up to the next generation patriotic figures such as the Trung Sisters and Phan Chu Trinh, who led a peaceful movement against the French. The Trung Sisters, however, were a more substantial rallying tool. These two sisters were largely responsible for repelling Chinese rule during the beginning of the 1st Century A.D. and represented the determination for autonomy that each Vietnamese nationalist felt inside. This also fueled resentment against the pro-Western leaders of the South who wanted full cooperation with the United States.
General William Westmoreland was the Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) beginning in 1964 and would later become the Army Chief of Staff in 1968. General Westmoreland drafted a comprehensive three point plan that would achieve victory in Vietnam and he aggressively lobbied this strategy to policymakers in Washington D.C. to increase support for military involvement. His plan was conducive to victory given the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine during the 1960s. It encompassed everything from an increase of troops to the use of NATO and regional alliances.
Phase one of Westmoreland’s plan was to rally support, not only from the United States, but also from other Western and pro-democracy governments to turn the tide of war. At this time, the United States was fighting a figurative uphill battle. Our troops were always taught to fight the last war. The conflict in Vietnam was a significant change with regard to the tactics employed by the enemy. Our conventional forces were not accustomed to fighting against an invisible enemy such as booby traps and civilian combatants. Westmoreland’s goal was to put the United States and its allies on the offensive and formulate a means to measure success.
General Westmoreland continues his strategy with the second part involving a large scale offensive campaign. There was some hesitation in Washington D.C. regarding large scale combat, however Westmoreland gave an anticipated victory date for 1967 and this gave a false end to an open ended situation. The second part of this plan was strictly combative. His goal was to destroy many of the guerilla fighters and as many of the uniformed regular enemy forces as possible. Westmoreland’s goal was to put the enemy in a defensive situation and slowly push them from metropolitan or populated areas.
Westmoreland concluded his strategy citing that if the enemy remained a threat the United States would need to continue their efforts for another at least another year and attack them in their remote posts. This plan was successful in achieving enough support to continue, especially from President Johnson. Perhaps the largest cause of this strategy’s popularity was the fact that the United States was caught in a stalemate, not because the United States lacked the means to combat the enemy, but simply because United States policy prior to Westmoreland’s efforts didn’t allow full scale military involvement.
Johnson was decisive in forming public opinion after Westmoreland received approval because he maintained a sense of feeling where nothing new was occurring in Vietnam. He expressed to the media that we were still assisting the South Vietnamese and how the responsibility of defeating Communist forces fell solely on the South Vietnamese military, as it did prior to Westmoreland moving on the offensive. With the sense of continuity occupying the public and Johnson’s war powers he received from Congress, the executive branch gained near absolutism in regards to the management of troops and the campaigns that would be waged.
Throughout America’s involvement in Vietnam, the military had to disguise its offensive missions as retaliation for an attack on American forces, largely because the war had prominent critics in Congress and no politician would denounce the American military’s inherent right to self-defense. Johnson was hard at work back in Washington carefully carving the image of our mission which would suit American policy and satisfy his desire to continue what President Kennedy had begun. While this was occurring, the United States military was preparing for full scale offensive combat on a scale unseen since World War Two. A pivotal moment came near the Vietnamese city of Chu Lai where units within the 3rd Marine Division mounted an offensive against the Vietcong.
On August 18th, 1965, all diplomacy had failed and the Marines launched Operation Starlight from three fronts. From the southeast, an amphibious assault; from the west, a hellebore assault; and from the north, the infantry moved in. The Viet Cong was trapped in the Van Ton Peninsula and nearly one thousand enemy kills were achieved on August 24th . This battle was significant because it gave the American people and politicians at home a public victory which would lessen dissent among war critics for the time being.
This particular battle was one of the few times where the Viet Cong fought in a conventional sense. Being mostly a guerilla force, they were fond of attacking small groups of Americans from concealed locations and immediately moving into another location. Their attempt to stand up to the American military would not soon be repeated. Nevertheless, the 1st Vietcong Regiment was disassembled as an effective fighting force and they felt their first defeat while losing their safe havens along the coast.
As with most conflicts, a nation or other occupying force cannot achieve victory solely based on military efforts. Diplomats and intelligence officials are still active in trying to lessen the length and intensity of war. Every branch in the American armed forces employs Officers who are educated in engaging with the indigenous public and battle the enemy on a social front.
There seemed to be a new trend within the American populous where a violent attitude was adopted towards the war in Vietnam and towards the troops fighting there. This was prevalent on the floors of Congress where the decision to go to war was being constantly questioned. Propaganda would be employed throughout Vietnam, but also surprisingly, at home in America. This effort was mainly to help ease the friction between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of Congress who never voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and still actively proposed the standing down of American forces in Vietnam.
However, without political stability in Vietnam, there would be no political stability at home. With the U.S. Military’s counterinsurgency operations in full swing, our Generals in the field acknowledged the need for thorough improvement and maintenance of public affairs efforts. Our politicians saw blunders from the past and adopted a policy where the government of the United States publicly denounced the use of torture. Anything that happened covertly, however, would not be disclosed. This did not add any unneeded motivation for the enemy to feed on. It would actually encourage cooperation from indigenous people in Vietnam and assist with our counterinsurgency efforts.
Perhaps the strongest element of this cooperation was the use of Combined Action Platoons or CAPs. CAPs were the primary example used back home to convey a sense of partnership with the South Vietnamese. CAPs were made up of thirty eight men from the South Vietnamese Popular Force and were embedded with a Marine Rifle Squad and given the task of protecting a single South Vietnamese village. This was key in the success of America’s counterinsurgency efforts and was also the cornerstone in maintaining Congressional support back home, thusly assuring the continuance of military operation overseas.
The strategic and political importance of this strategy was that by having an American military force located in each village accompanied by indigenous Vietnamese soldiers, it would ultimately instill in each citizen a sense of trust and they would turn to the CAPs for assistance or advice instead of pledging loyalty to the Viet Cong. This gave the Vietnamese a sense of stability and security because they were confident in the CAPs fighting ability and grew comfortable in the fact that their villages were safe.
Since the decision to go to war had already been made, and some would argue it was inevitable, the only democratic tool available was debate. This occurred on the floors of Congress as well as in the media. There became a point when the Johnson Administration needed to determine how much information they would be allowed to withhold under the Constitution. There was a large debate and concern over what could be deliberated during a time of war, not only among the public, but within the government. This led to a practice of publicly condemning Policymakers who had opposed the war and labeled them as un-patriotic. We see this today and throughout the span of American political history.
The need for regulated censorship became clear. Scare tactics were employed to justify this action which was dangerously close to being unconstitutional such as the fear of Communist infiltration in American society. These efforts most often took the form of withdrawing funding to programs which had affiliations with anti-war movements or those who were overtly critical of the Johnson Administration.
Perhaps the largest tool used by the Presidents during the Vietnam War was to either misdirect or not disclose casualty figures from the battlefield. Nixon was very skilled at this as he would report casualty figures as “low” when they were higher than he was anticipating or was previously told. This was widely used by Commanders and Politicians alike in an effort to maintain the succession of opinion that the decision to go to war in Vietnam was correct, despite the knowledge obtained through hindsight.
The North Vietnamese acted with very little concern regarding lives lost or the body count. Ho Chi Minh and his top advisors expressed that they would fight down to the last man in exchange for a final victory. This method of measurement itself is largely imprecise due to the practice of falsifying records on both sides as a method of propaganda.
Since the war in Vietnam was so controversial, there was widespread social outcry demanding that the United States withdraw from Vietnam and that our troops, politicians, and commanders were responsible for all atrocities that occurred in Vietnam. The largest cause for this growing movement was the broadcast media. For the first time in history, there was a television set in most households and you had a well known news figure embedded with the military reporting what was happening in very vivid visual detail. In prior conflicts, newsreels would be edited, not necessarily to supply a bias, but to shield the public from the horrors of war. This practice was seen as counterproductive from a news standpoint and was viewed as unethical.
One of the root causes to the widespread broadcast of negative Vietnam coverage is the institution of competition. Since Vietnam was seen as negative due to the cause of war being unclear and discrepancies coming from the Oval Office, many Americans had preconceived ideas that the war in Vietnam was bad. The news companies simply needed to stay up in the ratings and polls taken from random samples declared that American were more receptive to negative war coverage.
The group throughout the nation who had the loudest voice crying out dissent and was most active in protest was the Counterculture. The Counterculture had various celebrities, such as the Grateful Dead and Jimi Hendrix, to endorse them and had many followers to spread their message coast to coast. The Counterculture battled many issues such as racial equality to women’s rights and had social criticisms which were well received to teenage and college-age Americans. However, the most publicized effort, and the one which left their mark on the History books, was their effort to end the war in Vietnam. It is important to note that the Counterculture was voicing their opposition to the war since its early stages and it was only when the mainstream public grew frustrated with the way it was being handled was when the Counterculture became the unofficial spokesmen for society.
College campuses became a prime venue for antiwar protests and accommodated a free discussion of the issues. This tradition continues in almost all Colleges across the United States. The Counter Culture used the reputable names of their respective schools and the news media to spread their message, quite effectively, from coast to coast. This was largely caused by overwhelming agreement that the war in Vietnam needed to end quickly and was fueled by reports of war crimes on the battlefield committed by Americans.
Although the Counterculture was not the sole cause for America’s withdrawal from Vietnam, they were pivotal in changing public policy. They lived out an American Dream that you never hear about anymore; one which was not of material ambitions. They lived out the American Dream where a few people speaking out in protest on a college campus in San Francisco can change the mind of some of the most powerful people in the world all the way in Washington D.C. and change the tone surrounding the war in Vietnam.
The climax of the war in Vietnam, at least from a political standpoint, came on March 3, 1968. President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he would not run for reelection. This was a huge hit to the morale of the troops fighting overseas because it was the Kennedy-Johnson Administration who came to the American people with a plan and were the key architects in our involvement over in Vietnam. However, Johnson’s failing health and the internal division of the Democratic Party during 1968 made the inevitable campaign undesirable for a President seeking a sure victory. Shortly after Johnson had announced his intentions not to seek reelection, a discussion began on Capitol Hill regarding the eventual withdrawal of troops.
Just a few miles down the Potomac, the Pentagon had their own crisis to deal with; one which would be a military success, but would change the tide of public opinion at home. The Tet Offensive, which occurred during January of 1968, was a pivotal moment in America’s mission in Vietnam that would change everything. During the holiday of Tet (Lunar New Year) the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong broke a ceasefire which was in effect and launched a surprise attack on 100 cities across Vietnam. Although the Americans and allies were quick to respond and repelled the attackers, ultimately claiming victory, this event had the opposite effect at home. This was seen as a severe failure in intelligence and eventually led to widespread distrust in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of President.
Richard Nixon was elected by a slim majority over Hubert Humphrey. Nixon made it very clear that he wanted to end the war in Vietnam. He constantly expressed the need for “peace with honor”. He and Dr. Henry Kissinger, who was Nixon’s Secretary of State, worked feverishly to ease tensions between the Soviet Union and China and to work on a multilateral base to peacefully transfer the security of South Vietnam back to the South Vietnamese. In addition, Nixon called upon the allies of the United States to assist in securing peace.
Many have tried to decipher the phrase “peace with honor” since Nixon coined it during the 1968 Presidential Election. Nixon wanted to call on the “silent majority” of Americans who still thought that the United States could win in Vietnam, but achieved little support on that issue. Many had warned that it would be political suicide to promote a pro-war agenda and that the only necessary means to try and secure victory would be to stay the course in Vietnam.
Nixon stated later in 1973 that the government of the United States would continually recognize the Republic of Vietnam as the sole governing body of South Vietnam. By this policy, South Vietnam was still considered an ally of the United States and Nixon made large efforts to arm the Army of the Republic of Vietnam or ARVN. This practice would prove disastrous when the North Vietnamese Army invaded South Vietnam and captured Saigon two years later. The beginning of the end in Vietnam was just beginning.
Many critics of the war in Vietnam, however, fail to recognize the correctness of the government’s actions in the region. It’s very easy and unnecessary to point out what “should” have been done when looking back at an event with contemporary knowledge. The United States had a policy of containment to uphold and was actively battling Communism for over a decade at the war’s onset. The United States also had an obligation to our allies in South Vietnam by helping them with the same principles that were expressed during the Korean War. The decision to go to war had already been made and the problem now was finding a way to peacefully and honorably withdraw from Vietnam while supporting our allies all while using tactile methods which would preserve the most life.
This didn’t seem to be a large concern of the anti-war doves. The American military needed to leave Vietnam, and now. The confidence that Americans once felt with respect to the Office of the President of the United States were disappearing. On June 13th 1971, the New York Times published excerpts from a study which soon became referred to as the Pentagon Papers. These documents were leaked to the New York Times by Daniel Ellsberg which disclosed the American involvement in Vietnam beginning in 1945. The suspicions that many critics carried with them would soon be proven when information was made public about how the war was intentionally continued by dropping bombs over Laos and all of the tools and strategies which were in opposition to the public policies of the United States, but were employed anyway, were brought to light and put under scrutiny by Congress.
The election of 1972 was, in a way, a referendum on the war in Vietnam. This was the center issue of the election and the Candidates used the deteriorating public support to offer a resolution to the war. President Richard Nixon ran as the Republican incumbent and, yet again, approached the American people with a promise of peace. Nixon’s Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger was active during this time in a peace negotiation with North Vietnam, but needed to draft terms which would be acceptable for the government of South Vietnam. These negotiations began as a secret, but the North soon went public when they deemed the peace agreement favored the American’s ally of South Vietnam. Nixon needed to make a move which would please South Vietnam and force North Vietnam back into the peace talks.
Last ditch efforts were employed by the United States to turn the tide of war. Prior to this, the United States has not lost a war and the closest the United States military has ever come to defeat was the stalemate of the Korean War. There were massive air campaigns launched over North Vietnam; some were aggressive in nature, however some were defensive maneuvers or pre-emptive strikes.
Operation Linebacker was the first large scale air bombardment campaign since President Johnson had halted further air attacks in the North earlier in 1968. Like most deep missions, this was a joint effort among the three branches wielding airpower and made valuable use of the Air Forces B-52 bombers. The main intention of this campaign was to decrease the materials and personnel moving south to fight in the Easter Offensive.
The Easter Offensive was a massive attack by the North against the South Vietnamese and the United States. The conventional element of the North Vietnamese Army was the largest ever seen by the United States since the Korean War. This Easter Offensive was significant because this was the first attempt to invade South Vietnam since the Tet Offensive four years earlier. Victory was eventually claimed by both sides since the North Vietnamese suffered high casualties, but made their way deep into the Southern territory. The North was also successful in capturing numerous South Vietnamese units stationed in remote bases throughout the countryside west of Da Nang.
Operation Linebacker 2 was an air campaign on a massive scale. The United States Air Force bombed Hanoi and destroyed much of the North Vietnamese infrastructure. The United States was successful in this attempt because the North Vietnamese left Hanoi and other largely populated areas virtually undefended due to the presumption that the United States and the South would not invade North Vietnam. There were, however, surface-to-air missiles spread throughout the North and Communist fighter jets stationed sporadically.
This event was pivotal, not only on the battlefield, but at home. This air campaign put the North in a situation where they had no choice but to negotiate. While this was occurring in the military world, the Nixon Administration pressured the government of South Vietnam to accept the terms of peace as they were or risk the loss of American aid. The counterculture and dissenters in the United States were quick to respond with, yet another period of intense anti-war protests.
Naturally, this wasn’t well received at home or in Saigon. Nixon had essentially put both the government of South Vietnam and the American people between a rock and a hard place. Saigon and the United States had decades of cooperation behind them and neither party wanted the war to continue. The North Vietnamese themselves had drained much of their resources fighting this war and, although reluctant, succumbed to Operation Linebacker 2 and approached the peace talks.
Thanks to much effort by Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Paris Peace Accord was signed on January 27, 1973. This action ultimately ended America’s direct military involvement in Vietnam. We would, however, need to maintain diplomatic relations with the South and maintain the welfare of our military still stationed in South Vietnam. This did temporarily cease fighting in Vietnam, but as the military mobilized in areas throughout Vietnam, small firefights would continue to take American’s lives. In addition, the security of the American Embassy in Saigon became even more inherent as it would soon become America’s only safe haven in the country.
The Paris Peace Accords was a very simple solution to a very complicated and long standing problem, or so it seemed. The agreement was a success as it did allow our forces to recover the dead bodies of American servicemen and exchange Prisoners of War, but it would be short lived. In December of 1974, the North Vietnamese attacked the South in a series of guerilla style skirmishes. This was obviously a breach of the Paris Peace Accords and surprised the government in the South and was received in the United States as a provocative act by the Government and Joint Chiefs of Staff, but as typical by many Americans.
This was clearly a prime example of what two nations see as an acceptable means to secure peace. The military wanted peace through diplomatic means since a prolonged and costly war would be unacceptable to many Americans, but maintained military involvement as long as the South needed them. The North aspired to end the war through the defeat of the South and felt that any peace agreement which included the United States would favor the pro-western government of South Vietnam.
Shortly after the offensive by the North Vietnamese, the President of South Vietnam resigned and blamed much of the failure on the United States. He stated in a radio broadcast after he left office that the South was betrayed by the United States due largely to the fact that the United States cut much of the foreign aid which the South was receiving prior to the Paris Peace Accords. The United States pledged to end direct involvement, which included financial support for the South Vietnamese military. This left the South Vietnamese military high and dry with nominal domestic resources to rely on for victory.
President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam claimed that he was tricked into signing the Paris Peace Accords by Henry Kissinger. He stated that Kissinger, on behalf of the United States, promised military aid to help repel the incoming North Vietnamese and secure a sovereign border. The United States, at the time, stated that they would continue their air support in a defensive role as to not violate the Paris Peace Accord. The United States did not act when their ally was in trouble and this was later acknowledged by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.
With the United States bound to the peace agreement, they quickly focused their efforts and resources to moving and evacuating American military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel out of Vietnam. The North was aggressively conquering the South and with many funds from the Communist Bloc, was able to reinforce and recruit new members to the Viet Cong in the South. They carefully conquered the villages that the Americans had once successfully controlled and used fear to fuel chaos on the streets of Saigon.
With the political structure of South Vietnam collapsing, America’s allies were in danger of retaliation by the North. The security blanket provided by the United States had been repealed by those who were thousands of miles away and indigenous personnel and other civilians were left to fend for themselves or escape via American helicopter. Martial law was ordered throughout Saigon and quickly fueled the unrest already in existence. North Vietnamese tanks rolled into Saigon and quickly engulfed the border areas of the city. The airport located within the city was shelled by NVA rocket and mortar attack rendering the station inoperable.
Operation Frequent Wind commenced. American helicopters throughout Saigon quickly evacuated American military personnel and diplomatic civilians. The code word for this operation was a reference to the weather in Japan followed by the playing of “White Christmas”. This was made available to the news media and eventually was made known to local Vietnamese. Once the signal was given, thousands of Vietnamese rushed to the Embassy in an attempt to escape the defeat which was sure to come.
This effort was a joint campaign between the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and CIA. The joint military aircraft largely consisted of various versions of the Chinook helicopter. This aircraft which uses twin rotors and can lift a larger capacity than most helicopters. The CIA used Air America, which is a privately employed air service used by the CIA as civilian satellite organization. Operation Frequent Wind was successful from a military standpoint as it accomplished all military objectives.
The second to last helicopter to leave the Embassy carried the Ambassador to a naval warship waiting 80 miles away. There was still a small squad of Marines left on the Embassy roof, mainly consisting of Military Police. There was a small discrepancy in the plans and it was assumed that the remaining Marines were accompanying the Ambassador on the helicopter. It wasn’t until he was received back on the Navy ship that it was discovered that Marines were still on the rooftop. Three hours after the Ambassador was extracted, the remaining Marines were taken to safety.
Many lessons were learned from Vietnam and certain measures were taken to ensure it most likely wouldn’t happen again. The War Powers Act of 1973, also known as Public Law 93-148, was passed in Congress. This would essentially repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and from then on, the President as Commander in Chief, would have absolute power over the military for a period of 60 days. After the initial period, the President would need to obtain power from Congress to continue his efforts, whatever they may be. These Congressional resolutions themselves have an expiration date which keeps both branches of government in check.
The war in Vietnam was unique in the fact that a large majority of battles or skirmishes were won by Americans or Combined Action units. There was relative stability in the South as far as government was concerned, although there were military assaults targeting civilians which accompanies the fog of war scenario in an insurgency. Progress from a tactical standpoint was slow progressing, but the stalemate observed from a South Vietnamese government facing a Communist takeover was seen as a victory.
Never before in American history had military and politics been so intertwined that it grew to be counterproductive to victory in Southeast Asia. In prior wars, Generals were given much latitude in their decision making abilities, mainly out of necessity. During Vietnam, however, the Commanders in the field and Diplomats in Saigon could speak with the President in real time and receive his authorization to proceed with military plans. This caused some problems because a General doesn’t have to run for reelection and therefore be so inclined to make decisions based on public opinion.
Public opinion has never been so vital to the way that war was waged. Young Americans and Counterculture members proved that democracy wasn’t just a theory. They showed what can happen when enough Americans who want change work together to achieve it. The television set was used as a vital tool for directing the populous by both the Government and dissenters alike. We can verify this decades later as nearly all aspects of our lives involve, in some way, a television set.
The war in Vietnam was one of the most costly; not in human life, but in materials and natural resources. The phrase which comes to mind is that you cannot simply go to war, but that you need to take a nation to war. From this idea, Vietnam was a failure due to the unilateral move by the Executive Branch and the clever misdirection of facts to increase our involvement. It is hard to say that with enough resolve the United States could have won in Vietnam. It is safe to say that with the right strategy and a concise knowledge of the nation’s history, many blunders could have been overcame and the war may have ended in victory earlier than anticipated.
References
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Max Frankel. Special to The New York Times. "U.S. Ships and 1,800 Marines on Way to Indochina Area; Laos Decrees Emergency: U.S. Moves to Counter Laos Crisis." New York Times (1857-Current file), May 13, 1962, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed October 30, 2007).
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